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This article is devoted to the tactical game theoretical interpretation of dialectics.
Dialectical games are considered as abstractly as well as models of the internal dia-
logue and reflection. The models related to the representation theory (representative
dynamics) are specially investigated in detail, they correlate with the hypothesis on
the dialectical features of human thinking in general and mathematical thought (the
constructing of a solution of mathematical problem) in particular.
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Introduction
The mathematical formalism of interactive games, which extends one of ordinary
games (see e.g.[1]) and is based on the concept of an interactive control, was re-
cently proposed by the author [2] to take into account the complex composition of
controls of a real human person, which are often complicated couplings of his/her
cognitive and known controls with the unknown subconscious behavioral reactions.
In the article [3] the dialogues as psycholinguistic phenomena were described in the
interactive game theoretical terms. It allowed to transfer from the pure interac-
tivity to the essentially new and much complex phenomenon of tactics [4]. The
tactical games were introduced together with some useful methods of their con-
structing, examples were considered and applications specified. Generally, tactics
may be regarded as ”an art to manipulate the unknown, which is manifested by
the interactivity, without making it known” [4], in particular, tactical actions are
not completely understood even by the acting person.
The present article is devoted to the abstract foundations of tactics, precisely,
to the interactive game theoretical interpretation of dialectics. The least is defined
as a logical self-describing tactical game. A proper subclass of tactical games is
extracted, they are the dialectical games, the tactical games, which are tactical ex-
tensions of dialectics. And if tactics is thought as an art to manipulate the unknown
without making it known, dialectics may be thought as an art to comprehend such
manipulations.
An interesting type of dialectical games is related to the representation theory,
with a strong accent on its inverse problems and representative dynamics. The
special attention is paid to such games as well as to the various sides of interaction
of tactics, dialectics and representation theory that is the main theme of this article.
The present article finishes two-year researches of the author on the mathemat-
ical formulation of the game theoretical background for interactivity and tactics.
It seems that the picture is complete now and all main concepts are introduced.
However, many technical details should be clarified but the practice is essential
here. Certainly, only the practice may determine the directions of future theoreti-
cal studies. Mathematical proof of any nontrivial statement claims a lot of time and
efforts, and when the initial direction was misguiding the whole activity is simply
senseless. So let’s “learn to labor and to wait”.
I. Tactics
1.1. Interactive games [2].
Definition 1 [2]. An interactive system (with n interactive controls) is a control
system with n independent controls coupled with unknown or incompletely known
feedbacks (the feedbacks as well as their couplings with controls are of a so com-
plicated nature that their can not be described completely). An interactive game
is a game with interactive controls of each player.
Below we shall consider only deterministic and differential interactive systems.
In this case the general interactive system may be written in the form:
(1) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un),
where ϕ characterizes the state of the system and ui are the interactive controls:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), [ϕ(τ)]|τ6t),
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i.e. the independent controls u◦i (t) coupled with the feedbacks on [ϕ(τ)]|τ6t. One
may suppose that the feedbacks are integrodifferential on t.
However, it is reasonable to consider the differential interactive games, whose
feedbacks are purely differential. It means that
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)).
A reduction of general interactive games to the differential ones via the introducing
of the so-called intention fields was described in [2]. Below we shall consider the
differential interactive games only if the opposite is not specified explicitely.
The interactive games introduced above may be generalized in the following
ways.
The first way, which leads to the indeterminate interactive games, is based on
the idea that the pure controls u◦i (t) and the interactive controls ui(t) should not be
obligatory related in the considered way. More generally one should only postulate
that there are some time-independent quantities Fα(ui(t), u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t))
for the independent magnitudes ui(t) and u
◦
i (t). Such claim is evidently weaker
than one of Def.1. For instance, one may consider the inverse dependence of the
pure and interactive controls: u◦i (t) = u
◦
i (ui(t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)).
The second way, which leads to the coalition interactive games, is based on
the idea to consider the games with coalitions of actions and to claim that the
interactive controls belong to such coalitions. In this case the evolution equations
have the form
(2) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, v1, . . . , vm),
where vi is the interactive control of the i-th coalition. If the i-th coalition is defined
by the subset Ii of all players then
vi = vi(ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t), u◦j |j ∈ Ii).
Certainly, the intersections of different sets Ii may be non-empty so that any player
may belong to several coalitions of actions. Def.1 gives the particular case when
Ii = {i}.
Remark 1. One is able to consider interactive games of discrete time in the similar
manner.
Remark 2. If one suspect that the explicit dependence of the feedbacks on the
derivatives of ϕ is not correct because they are determined via the evolution equa-
tions governed by the interactive controls, it is reasonable to use the inverse depen-
dence of pure and interactive controls.
Interactive games are games with incomplete information by their nature. How-
ever, this incompleteness is in the unknown feedbacks, not in the unknown states.
The least situation is quite familiar to specialists in game theory and there is a
lot of methods to have deal with it. For instance, the unknown states are inter-
preted as independent controls of the virtual players and some muppositions on
their strategies are done. To transform interactive games into the games with an
incomplete information on the states one can use the following trick, which is called
the ε-representation of the interactive game.
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Definition 2. The ε-representation of the differential interactive game is a repre-
sentation of the interactive controls ui(t) in the form
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . .ϕ
(k)(t); εi(t))
with the known function ui of its arguments u
◦
i , ϕ, . . . , ϕ
(k) and εi, whereas
εi(t) = εi(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)
is the unknown function of u◦i and ϕ, . . . , ϕ
(k).
εi are interpreted as parameters of feedbacks and, thus, characterize the internal
existential states of players. It motivates the notation ε. Certainly, ε-parameters
are not really states being the unknown functions of the states and pure controls,
however, one may sometimes to apply the standard procedures of the theory of
games with incomplete information on the states. For instance, it is possible to re-
gard εi as controls of the virtual players. The na¨ıvely introduced virtual players only
double the ensemble of the real ones in the interactive games but in the coalition
interactive games the collective virtual players are observed. More sophisticated
procedures generate ensembles of virtual players of diverse structure.
Precisely, if the derivatives of ϕ are excluded from the feedbacks (at least, from
the interactive controls ui as functions of the pure controls, states and the ε-
parameters) the evolution equation will have the form
(3) ϕ˙(t) = Φ(ϕ, u1(u
◦
1(t), ϕ(t); ε1(t)), . . . , un(u
◦
n(t), ϕ(t); εn(t))),
so it is consistent to regard the equations as ones of the controlled system with
the ordinary controls u1, . . . , un, ε1, . . . , εn. One may consider a new game postu-
lating that these controls are independent. Such game will be called the ordinary
differential game associated with the ε-representation of the interactive game.
Let us consider now an arbitrary ordinary differential game with the evolution
equations
ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un),
where ϕ characterizes the state of the system and ui are the ordinary controls.
Let us fix a player. For simplicity of notations we shall suppose that it is the first
one. As a rule the players have their algorithms of predictions of the behaviour
of other players. For a fixed moment t0 of time let us consider the prediction of
the first player for the game. It consists of the predicted controls u◦[t0];i(t) (t > t0;
i ≥ 2) of all players and the predicted evolution of the system ϕ◦[t0](t). Let us fix
∆t and consider the real and predicted controls for the moment t0+∆t. Of course,
they may be different because other players use another algorithms for the game
prediction. One may interpret the real controls ui(t) (t = t0 +∆t; i ≥ 2) of other
players as interactive ones whereas the predicted controls u◦[t0];i(t) as pure ones, i.e.
to postulate their relation in the form:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
[t−∆t];i(t);ϕ
◦
[t0]
(τ)|τ ≤ t).
In particular, the feedbacks may be either reduced to differential form via the
introducing of the intention fields or simply postulated to be differential. Thus, we
4
constructed an interactive game from the initial ordinary game. One may use ϕ(τ)
as well as ϕ◦[t0](τ) in the feedbacks.
Note that the controls of the first player may be also considered as interactive if
the corrections to the predictions are taken into account when controls are chosen.
The obtained construction may be used in practice to make more adequate pre-
dictions. Namely, a posteriori analysis of the differential interactive games allows
to make the short-term predictions in such games. One should use such predictions
instead of the initial ones. Note that at the moment t0 the first player knows the
pure controls of other players at the interval [t0, t0+∆t] whereas their real freedom
is interpreted as an interactivity of their controls ui(t). So it is reasonable to choose
∆t not greater than the admissible time depth of the short-term predictions.
Na¨ıvely, the proposed idea to improve the predictions is to consider deviations of
the real behaviour of players from the predicted ones as a result of the interactivity,
then to make the short-term predictions taking the interactivity into account and,
thus, to receive the corrections to the initial predictions. Such corrections may be
regarded as “psychological” though really they are a result of different methods of
predictions used by players.
Remark 3. The interpretation of the ordinary differential game as an interactive
game also allows to perform the strategical analysis of interactive games. In-
deed, let us consider an arbitrary differential interactive game A. Specifying its
ε-representation one is able to construct the associated ordinary differential game
B with the doubled number of players. Making some predictions in the game B
one transform it back into an interactive game C. Combination of the strategical
long-term predictions in the game B with the short-term predictions in C is often
sufficient to obtain the adequate strategical prognosis for A.
Remark 4. The interpretation of the ordinary differential game as an interactive
game is especially useful in situations, when the goals of players are not known
precisely to each other and some more or less rough suppositions are made.
Let’s expose another way to obtain an interactive game from the ordinary differ-
ential game. If one has an ordinary differential game with the states ϕ(t) and the
controls ui(t) it is possible to introduce some filtering procedure for controls, for
instance, the exclusion of the high frequency components or the separation of fre-
quencies from some special set. The result will be denote by u◦i (t). One may suspect
that u◦i (t) = u
◦
i (ui(t);ϕ(t), ϕ˙(t), ϕ¨(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)) and use a posteriori analysis for
estimation of the feedback. In general, the filtering procedure may depend on ϕ(t)
and its derivatives but in any case the interactive game is constructed. Also one may
consider the integrodifferential form of feedbacks: u◦i (t) = u
◦
i (ui(t), [ϕ(τ)]|τ6t).
Note that both versions to unravel an interactivity of the ordinary differential
game may be combined.
Remark 5. The unraveling of the interactivity of ordinary differential games is an
essential step for the understanding of the complex psychophysiological processes.
The next step is to describe if necessary the interactivity in terms of intention fields
and to unravel their structure (to solve the inverse problem of representation the-
ory). It may be useful to interpret the intention fields as fields of interactive forces.
This scheme may be applied to various interesting psychophysiological phenomena
usually exposed in terms of Eastern (presumably, Chineese and Indian) traditions.
Note that their use in medicine is certainly a tactical problem (see below).
5
1.2. Dialogues and verbalizable games [3]. Let us now expose the interactive
game formalism for a description of dialogues as psycholinguistic phenomena [3].
First of all, note that one is able to consider interactive games of discrete time as
well as interactive games of continuous time above.
Defintion 3A (the na¨ıve definition of dialogues) [3]. The dialogue is a 2-
person interactive game of discrete time with intention fields of continuous time.
The states and the controls of a dialogue correspond to the speech whereas the
intention fields describe the understanding.
Let us give the formal mathematical definition of dialogues now.
Definition 3B (the formal definition of dialogues) [3]. The dialogue is a
2-person interactive game of discrete time of the form
(4) ϕn = Φ(ϕn−1, ~vn, ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn).
Here ϕn = ϕ(tn) are the states of the system at the moments tn (t0 < t1 < t2 <
. . .<tn<. . . ), ~vn=~v(tn)=(v1(tn), v2(tn)) are the interactive controls at the same
moments; ξ(τ) are the intention fields of continuous time with evolution equations
(5) ξ˙(t) = Ξ(ξ(t), ~u(t)),
where ~u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t)) are continuous interactive controls with ε–represented
couplings of feedbacks:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ξ(t); εi(t)).
The states ϕn and the interactive controls ~vn are certain known functions of the
form
(6)
ϕn =ϕn(~ε(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn =~vn(~u
◦(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn).
Note that the most nontrivial part of mathematical formalization of dialogues
is the claim that the states of the dialogue (which describe a speech) are certain
“mean values” of the ε–parameters of the intention fields (which describe the un-
derstanding).
Important. The definition of dialogue may be generalized on arbitrary number of
players and below we shall consider any number n of them, e.g. n = 1 or n = 3,
though it slightly contradicts to the common meaning of the word “dialogue”.
An embedding of dialogues into the interactive game theoretical picture generates
the reciprocal problem: how to interpret an arbitrary differential interactive game
as a dialogue. Such interpretation will be called the verbalization.
Definition 4 [3]. A differential interactive game of the form
ϕ˙(t) = Φ(ϕ(t), ~u(t))
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), ϕ˙(t), ϕ¨(t), . . . ϕ
(k)(t); εi(t))
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is called verbalizable if there exist a posteriori partition t0<t1<t2<. . .< tn<. . .
and the integrodifferential functionals
(7)
ωn(~ε(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn(~u
◦(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
such that
(8) ωn = Ω(ωn−1, vn;ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn).
The verbalizable differential interactive games realize a dialogue in sense of Def.3.
Remark 6. One may include ωn explicitely into the evolution equations for ϕ
ϕ˙(τ) = Φ(ϕ(τ), ~u(τ);ωn), τ ∈ [tn, tn+1].
as well as into the feedbacks and their couplings.
The main heuristic hypothesis is that all differential interactive games “which
appear in practice” are verbalizable. The verbalization means that the states of a
differential interactive game are interpreted as intention fields of a hidden dialogue
and the problem is to describe such dialogue completely. If a differential interactive
game is verbalizable one is able to consider many linguistic (e.g. the formal grammar
of a related hidden dialogue) or psycholinguistic (e.g. the dynamical correlation of
various implications) aspects of it.
During the verbalization it is a problem to determine the moments ti. A way
to the solution lies in the structure of ε-representation. Let the space E of all
admissible values of ε-parameters be a CW-complex. Then ti are just the moments
of transition of the ε-parameters to a new cell.
1.3. Tactical games [4]. Tactics as it will be defined below is derived from two
independent concepts: the parametric interactive games and external controls on
one hand and the comments to dialogues on another hand.
First of all, note that an interactive game may depend on the additional para-
maters. Such dependence is of two forms. First, parameters may appear in the
evolution equations:
(9A) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un;λ).
Here, λ is a collective notation for parameters. Second, parameters may appear in
feedbacks:
(9B) ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t);λ).
The dependence of ui on λ is either unknown (incompletely known) or known.
The least means that ∂ui/∂λ may be expressed via ui as a function of other vari-
ables (such expression are integrodifferential on these variables). Both variants of
parametric dependence of interactive game may be combined together.
The additional paramaters may realize the external controls. In this situation
they depend on time:
λ = λ(t).
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In practice, such situation appear in the teaching systems. The parameters are
interpreted as controls of a teacher. This example is rather typical. It shows that
the controls λ(t) may be considered as “slow” whereas the interactive controls ui(t)
as “quick”.
Of course, one is able to introduce the slow controls λ(t), which belong to the
same players as the interactive controls ui(t) or to their coalitions. And, certainly,
the slow controls of discrete time may be considered. One may suspect that the
discrete time controls λn realize a convenient approximation for the slow controls
λ(t), which is timer in practice.
The slow controls may be interactive.
If dependence of ui on λ is known and one consider the ε-representation of
feedbacks it is either postulated that ε-parameters do not depend on λ or claimed
that ∂ε/∂λ is expressed via ε as a function of other arguments.
Now let us define comments to the dialogue. Let
ωn = Ω(ωn−1, ~vn, ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
be the n-person dialogue with the discrete time interactive controls ~vn and the
intention fields governed by the evolution equations
ξ˙(t) = Ξ(ξ(t), ~u(t)),
where ~u(t) are the continuous interactive controls with ε–represented couplings of
feedbacks:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ξ(t); εi(t)).
The states ϕn and the interactive controls ~vn are expressed as
ωn =ωn(~ε(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn =~vn(~u
◦(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn).
The discrete time comments ϑn to the dialogue are defined recurrently as
(10) ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, ωn, vn).
Comments to the dialogue at the fixed moment tn contain various information
on the dialogue. For instance, one may to raise a problem to restore some features
of a dialogue from certain comments or alternatively what features of a dialogue
may be restored from the fixed comment.
The main difference of the comments ϑn from the states ωn is the absence of
expressions of the first via ~ε(τ) and ξ(τ) (tn−16τ6tn).
Comments are applied to the verbalizable games in the same way.
Tactical games combine mechanisms of parametric interactive games and com-
ments to the dialogue (verbalizable game).
Definition 5. The tactical game is a parametric verbalizable game with comments,
in which the parameters are of discrete time and coincide with the comments.
It is really wonderful that such simple definition is applicable to a very huge class
of phenomena. However, it is so! As it was marked above virtually all known forms
of human activity such as scientific researches and economics, sport or military
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actions, medicine, fine or martial arts, literature and music, theatre and dance,
psychotherapy and even magic may be regarded as certain tactical games. Trying
to improve the model I have no found any wider concept, whose using is necessary
and effective, whereas the notion of tactical game may describe these phenomena
very correctly.
Remark 7. The pairs (vn, ϑn) of discrete time interactive controls and the comments
will be called the tactical actions, whereas the continuous time interactive controls
ui(t) will be called the instant actions. The tactical actions may be involved as in
the evolution equations as in the interactivity.
Now we shall describe some operations over the tactical games (the tactical
interaction, the tactical synthesis and the tactical extension).
Let us consider two tactical games defined by the evolution equations
ϕ˙1 = Φ1(ϕ1, ~u1;ϑ1)
and
ϕ˙2 = Φ2(ϕ2, ~u2;ϑ2)
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
u1,i = u1,i(u
◦
1,i, ϕ1, ϕ˙1, ϕ¨1, . . . ϕ
(k)
1 ; ε1,i, ϑ1)
and
u2,i = u2,i(u
◦
2,i, ϕ2, ϕ˙2, ϕ¨2, . . . ϕ
(k)
2 ; ε2,i, ϑ2).
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωj,n(~εj(τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn),
~vj,n(~u
◦
j (τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωj,n = Ωj(ωj,n−1, vj,n;ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
hold (j = 1, 2). The comments ϑ1 and ϑ2 are defined recurrently as
ϑ1,n = Θ1(ϑ1,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n)
and
ϑ2,n = Θ2(ϑ2,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n).
The tactical interaction is realized by the addition of the interaction terms into
the recurrent formulas for ϑj to produce the interdetermination of comments:
(11A) ϑ1,n = Θ1(ϑ1,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n) + Θ˜
int
1,2(ϑ1,n−1, ϑ2,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n)
and
(11B) ϑ2,n = Θ2(ϑ2,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n) + Θ˜
int
2,1(ϑ2,n−1, ϑ1,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n).
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Let us consider N control systems represented as tactical games defined by the
evolution equations
ϕ˙j = Φj(ϕj , ~uj;ϑj)
(j = 1, 2, . . .N) with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
uj,i = uj,i(u
◦
j,i, ϕj, ϕ˙j , ϕ¨j, . . . ϕ
(k)
j ; εj,i, ϑj).
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωj,n(~εj(τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn),
~vj,n(~u
◦
j (τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωj,n = Ωj(ωj,n−1, vj,n;ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
hold. The comments ϑj are defined recurrently as
(12) ϑj,n = Θj(ϑj,n−1, ωj,n, vj,n).
The tactical synthesis is realized by the redefinition of the recurrent formulas for
ϑj to produce the unification of comments:
ϑj,n = Θ˜j(ϑ1,n−1, . . . ϑN,n−1, ω1,n, . . . , ωN,n, v1,n, . . . vN,n).
The functions Θ˜=(Θ˜1, . . . Θ˜N ) determines the synthesis.It may has various inter-
nal structure, which is characterized by the set of real arguments of functions Θ˜j
and their hierarchical structure. It presupposes that Θ˜j depend not on all triples
(ϑj , ωj, vj) and various triples may appear in Θ˜j in coalitions of different form and
nature. One may think that the functions Θ˜= (Θ˜1, . . . Θ˜N ) are constructed from
the functions Θ = (Θ1, . . .ΘN ) using some operations, which realize the synthesis.
Tactical interaction is a form of tactical synthesis of two games.
If under the tactical synthesis of two games (in particular, it may be a tactical
interaction) Θ˜1 = Θ1 we shall say that the tactical extension of the first game is
realized.
II. Dialectics and dialectical games
To unravel the abstract foundations of tactics is much more than to define it.
Such foundations should provide the description of tactical phenomena that pre-
supposes a possibility of their repreating and reproducing, whereas definitions only
established the rules of games. The following paragraph is an attempt to initi-
ate the investigation of such foundations. The crucial role is played by the game
theoretical definition of dialectics.
Definition 6. Dialectics is a logical self-describing tactical game.
”Logical” means that the game is purely cognitive and does not need obligatory
any material substrate or, otherwise, that its objects are notions. ”Self-describing”
means that all notions as well as procedures of their transformation, which consti-
tute the game evolution, are derived from themselves and that self-description as
a definition of all appearing objects from themselves is simultaneously the goal of
the game.
The main question is whether dialectics exists. Its existence should be considered
as a postulate.
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Postulate. Dialectics exists.
Apparently this postulate can not be derived in any way from the standard
mathematical foundations such as set theory, mathematical logic and arithmetics.
Moreover, there are no reasons to believe that it is possible to prove formally (i.e.
by means of mathematical logic) that it does not contradict to them. However, if
the postulate is adopted its compatibility with mathematical logic may be received
dialectically.
Another question is one of the equivalence of various forms of dialectics. It is
not a fact that dialectics is unique.
Now let us define dialectical games.
Definition 7. A dialectical game is a tactical extension of dialectics.
It means that dialectical games use some dialectical procedures combined with
others, otherwords, have elements of self-description. Dialectical games are not
obligatory logical. For instance, one may consider dialectical games of perception,
dialectical computer games, etc.
Note that dialectics as a tactical game itself is not given before but is self-
constructing during the dialectical game. It is its difference from the formal logic.
Remark 8. Dialectics allows to give self-consistent descriptions of any tactical games
and such descriptions are dialectical games. So one may think dialectics as a formal
cause of descriptibility of tactical phenomena.
Thus, if tactics is thinking as ”an art to manipulate the unknown, which is
manifested by the interactivity, without making it known” [4], dialectics should
be regarded as ”an art to comprehend these manipulations” and, moreover, as
”a kinaesthetic art to comprehend the unknown itself via manipulations over it”,
dialectics is an abstract and kinaesthetic contemplation of the unknown. Hence, the
dialetical games may be an effective tools for analysis and controlling of the internal
dialogue and the reflection because dialectics may be regarded as an interiorization
of tactics.
In fact, tactical games tends to be dialectical because any purposeful activity
presuppose some form of its understanding based on its description. Because de-
scription of a tactical phenomena is also a tactical game, to make such description
self-consistent one should use dialectics (or already constructed dialectical game).
Hence, tactics is effectiveness as much as it uses dialectics.
Let us describe a general form of the dialectical game. Such game is defined by
the evolution equations
ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, ~u;ϑ)
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
ui = ui(u
◦
i , ϕ, ϕ˙, ϕ¨, . . . ϕ
(k); εi, ϑ)
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωn(~ε(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn(~u
◦(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωn = Ω(ωn−1, vn;ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn).
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The comments ϑn are defined recurrently as
(13) ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, δn, ωn, vn),
where {δn} are self-describing objects of dialectics.
Remark 9. In the dialectical game the tactical actions (the pairs (vn, ϑn)) are con-
structed using the dialectical objects δn besides vn and ωn so dialectics appears as
a logic of tactics.
Remark 10. Often a dialectical game is a tactical extension of both dialectics and
a concrete tactical game of any nature.
Remark 11 (for a discussion): Dialectics may be regarded not only as a formal cause of
descriptibility of tactical phenomena but also as a formal cause of these phenomena themselves.
For an active cause of tactical (interactive) phenomena the notion ”ma¯ya¯” was adopted. One may
think that both causes form the same linguodynamical or logodynamical cause of tactics, and
for such linguodynamical unity of dialectics as a logical self-descripting tactical game and ma¯ya¯
as a universal dynamical principle of all subject-object relations the related term ”lila¯” is very
convenient. Because ma¯ya¯ is not neither object nor subject, and it is not active, there are no
any energetical or dialogical aspects of lila¯ itself, besides ones between real subjects and objects.
Lila¯ is thought as purely dynamical, kinaesthetical and contemplative dialectics of ma¯ya¯. Note
that ma¯ya¯ is objectivized in various forms: as intention fields or as fields of interactive forces. All
these objects may be visualized. The visualizations of lila¯ are the dialectical perception games,
combining visual, dynamical, kinaesthetical and dialectically contemplative aspects.
III. Dialectical games and representation theory
Let us describe a type of dialectical games, which may be considered simulta-
neously as illustrations of general concepts and as models for the internal dialogue
and the reflection.
First of all, some additional constructions, which realize a link between control
and representation theory, are necessary.
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3.1. Representative dynamics [5].
Definition 8. Let X = X(t) = (X1(t), . . .Xm(t)) (Xi(t) ∈ Matn(C)) be the time-
dependent vector of m complex n × n matrices. The representative dynamics is a
controlled system (with constraints) of the form
(14) X˙(t) = F (X(t), a(t))
with the fixed initial data X(t0), where the control parameter a(t) = (A(t), e(t))
is the pair of any associative algebra A(t) from the fixed class of such algebras A,
e(t) = (e1(t), . . . em(t)) is any set of algebraic generators of the algebra A(t) (one
may claim e(t) to be an algebraic basis in A(t)) such that the mapping ei(t) 7→ Xi(t)
may be extended to the representation T (t) : A(t) 7→ Matn(C) of the algebra A(t)
in the matrix algebra Matn(C) (this is a constraint on the control a(t)).
Certainly, the claim that (1) is a representative dynamics restricts the choice of
the function F and initial data X(t0) because for each moment t any admissible
choice of the pair (A(t), e(t)) should provide that the set of admissible pairs will
not be empty in future.
Remark 12. It is possible to consider the infinite dimensional algebras of operators
instead of Matn(C) or their subalgebras (e.g. commutative algebras of functions if
all algebras A(t) are commutative).
Remark 13. Let us consider the following equivalence on the set A of all admissible
a = (A, e). The pairs a1 = (A1, e1) and a2 = (A2, e2) will be equivalent iff the
algebras A1 and A2 are isomorphic under an isomorphism which maps the linear
space V1 spanned by the elements of e1 onto the linear space V2 spanned by the
elements of e2. Then the equivalence divides the time interval [t0, t1], on which the
representative dynamics is considered, onto the subsets, on which the pairs a(t) are
equivalent.
Remark 14. Representative dynamics combines structural and functional features.
The first are accumulated in the class A and the least are expressed by the function
F . Both are interrelated. The situation is similar to one in the group theory
of special functions. However, the difference is essential: in the representative
dynamics the functional aspects are not derived from the structural ones and hve
an independent origin.
Let us now describe the dynamical inverse problem of representation theory
for controlled systems following the general ideology of the inverse problems of
representation theory [6].
Definition 9. Let
(15) x˙ = ϕ(x, u),
be the controlled system, where x is the time-dependent m-dimensional complex
vector and u is the control parameter. Dynamical inverse problem of representation
theory for the controlled system (15) is to construct a representative dynamics
X˙ = F (X, a)
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and the function
a = a(u, x) such that ϕ(x, u) = f(x, a(u, x)),
where the operator function F is defined by the Weyl (symmetric) symbol f as a
function of m non-commuting variables X1, . . .Xm.
Remark 15. If the controls are absent and the pair a(t) = (A(t), e(t)) is time-
independent, Def.9 is reduced to the definition of the dynamical inverse problem of
representation theory [6].
Remark 16. One may consider dynamical inverse problem of representation theory
for games, the interactively controlled systems and interactive games.
Remark 17. If the function ϕ contained some constants cα ∈ C then one may inter-
pret them as time-independent variables and include the matrices Cα ∈ Matn(C)
instead of them in the operator function F (compare with the quantization of con-
stants [6]).
3.2. Tactical representative dynamics as dialectical game. Note that a
representative dynamics may be considered as a parametric one. The parameter is a
class A of associative algebras. Such view allows to define the tactical representative
dynamics.
Definition 10. The tactical representative dynamics is a tactical game, which is a
representative dynamics as a verbalizable interactive game, with the variable classes
An of associative algebras as the comments.
The change of the class An may be caused by the fact that the equations of
representative dynamics become insolvable in the class An−1.
One may describe solutions of many mathematical problems as tactical repre-
sentative dynamics. The keypoint is an algorithm of the constructing of comments,
i.e. how to derive a class An from the preceeding one An−1. Though in the simplest
case the recurrent formulas for comments are represented as
ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1),
where ϑn is the pair (An, ηn) of the class An and additional parameters ηn, the
general form is
ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, ωn, vn)
as it is in the definition of a tactical game or explicitely
{
An =A(An−1, ηn−1, ωn, vn)
ηn =H(ηn−1,An−1, ωn, vn)
However, it is intuitively clear that the dialectical objects should be involved into
this procedure because there are no any self-consistent ways to obtain any non-
trivially and principally new class An from the preceeding one An−1 so An should
be self-derived from An−1 and the transition An−1 ⇒ An should be described
in the internal terms of the class An. So the tactical representative dynamics
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corresponding to the solution of a mathematical problem should be a dialectical
game and the algorithm of the comments’ constructing should have the form
ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, δn, ωn, vn),
where δn are dialectical objects. Explicitely,{
An =A(An−1, ηn−1, δn, ωn, vn)
ηn =H(ηn−1,An−1, δn, ωn, vn)
Such tactical representative dynamics will be called dialectical. The expressions
for An describe its synthesis, which is the dialectical synthesis of a class An of
associative algebras.
Remark 18. The dialectical representative dynamics may be considered as a model
for the internal dialogue and reflection of a human. Here, the representations in
mathematical and psychological sense coincide. The associative algebras A(t) from
the classes An describe the cognitive aspect of the process. The recurrent formulas
for comments correspond to the deduction.
Remark 19. The tactical (dialectical) representative dynamics solves the inverse
problem of representation theory for the tactical (dialectical) games.
Remark 20. One can describe a dialectical object δ by the concrete transitions
(syntheses) An ⇒ An+1, which it governs.
Conclusions
Thus, the tactical game theoretical interpretation of dialectics is given. Dialec-
tical games are considered as abstractly as well as models of the internal dialogue
and reflection. The models related to the representation theory (representative
dynamics) are specially investigated in detail, they correlate with the hypothesis
on the dialectical features of human thinking in general and mathematical thought
(the constructing of a solution of mathematical problem) in particular.
Also the discussed subjects are significant for the understanding of tactical fea-
tures of various psychophysiological processes and their couplings with cognitive
ones during the functioning of the videocognitive and analogous integrated inter-
active systems and, thus in fact, for the clarification of the psychophysical nature
of cognitive activity.
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